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Optimal Family Policy in the Presence of Moral Hazard, 
When the Quantity and Quality of Children Are Stochastic
*
 
We examine the second-best family policy under the assumption that both the number and 
the future earning capacities of the children born to a couple are random variables with 
probability distributions conditional on unobservable parental actions. Potential parents take 
their decisions without taking into account the effects of these actions on the government’s 
future tax revenue. The second-best policy provides parents with credit and insurance, and 
allows them to appropriate the external benefits of their actions. 
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Given that the quantity and quality of children are a⁄ected by parental
decisions, is there any reason why the government should try to in￿ u-
ence those decisions, and, if so, how? These issues have been addressed
many times before in the literature,1 but the authors who have done
so make one or both of two questionable assumptions. One is that the
parental action which a⁄ects the quality of a child is observable by the
government. This overlooks the possibility that the action could be ei-
ther impossible or extremely costly for a public authority to monitor,
and may thus lead to incorrect policy prescriptions. Cigno, Luporini
and Pettini (2003) drop this assumption, and replace it with the one
that child quality is a random variable with given probability distribu-
tion conditional on a parental action. Further assuming that the density
function is common knowledge, but the conditioning action is private in-
formation, there is then a moral hazard problem. In the present paper,
we continue to assume that a child￿ s quality is a random variable with
given density, but relax two subsidiary assumptions made in that article,
namely that (i) a couple will necessarily set the conditioning action at
the same level for all its children, and (ii) all these children will have
necessarily the same quality if their parents set the action at the same
level for all of them.
The other questionable assumption concerns fertility determination.
In Cremer, Dellis and Pestieau (2003), the number of children is taken
to be exogenous, but may vary across households.2 In Balestrino, Cigno
and Pettini (2002), by contrast, this number is deterministically chosen
by the parents.3 Both extremes are unrealistic, and may lead to incor-
rect policy prescriptions. The one that fertility is exogenous because
it ignores the fertility e⁄ects of child-related policies. For example, as
pointed out in Cigno (1986), a family allowance designed to reduce child
poverty could result in a larger number of poor children, because it will
induce parents to have more children, but possibly (if the substitution-
e⁄ect prevails over the income-e⁄ect) also to spend less on each of them.
The one that fertility is a choice variable may lead to incorrect policy
prescriptions because it identi￿es the action of procuring a certain num-
ber of births with its outcome. As the latter is observable, a government
can then dictate how many children a couple should have by threaten-
ing a su¢ ciently severe penalty in case of disobedience. Therefore, the
1For a survey, see Cigno (2005).
2In much of the optimal taxation literature the number of children is not only
exogenous, but also the same (usually zero) for all households.
3In Cigno, Luporini and Pettini (2003), already cited, the quality of the children
is stochastic, but the number of births is deterministically chosen by the parents.
2government does not need to use costly incentives to get the socially op-
timal number of births. In the present paper, we depart from both these
approaches by recognizing that, like the quality of a child, the quan-
tity of children also is a random variable with probability distribution
conditional on an unobservable parental action.
In the present context, there are two justi￿cations for government
intervention. The ￿rst is that, as quantity and quality are uncertain,
couples will ￿nd it di¢ cult to borrow against their children￿ s expected
earnings.4 Given, however, that the number of present and future tax
payers is large, and assuming that the quantity of children born to dif-
ferent couples, and the qualities of these children, are independently
distributed, the government does not face any uncertainty regarding fu-
ture tax revenue, and will not have any di¢ culty in borrowing against
this revenue. The government may thus be able to raise social welfare
by lending to, and providing insurance for, would-be parents. The sec-
ond justi￿cation relates to the presence of a population externality. The
existence and nature of such an externality are among the questions left
open by the optimum population literature.5 Many of the demonstra-
tions provided by this literature are based on general-equilibrium ar-
guments which do not apply to the partial-equilibrium setting adopted
in the present paper. The only possible externalities, here, are ￿scal.
Given that today￿ s children are tomorrow￿ s tax payers, and provided
that a child￿ s quality can be measured by his or her future tax-paying
capacity, a couple￿ s behaviour will a⁄ect future tax revenue. As a couple
has no reason to consider this e⁄ect, a purpose of policy is then to inter-
nalize the externality by allowing parents to appropriate their children￿ s
expected contribution to government revenue.
The policy optimization has a Principal-Agent structure, with the
government in the role of principal, and couples in that of agents. Our
modelling strategy bears similarities to that of Holmstr￿m (1979, 1982),
but departs from it in two important respects. One is that the interests
of the principal are not diametrically opposed to those of the agents. In
our model, the government in fact maximizes the sum of the objective-
functions of the potential parents. The other is that our model has a
dynamic programming structure.
4The moral hazard problems which arise from the fact that the probability dis-
tributions of the quantity and quality of children are conditioned by unobservable
parental actions make it di¢ cult for a private lender to buy insurance against the
risk of default.
5See Eckstein and Wolpin (1985), Michel and Pestieau (1993), Peters (1995),
Razin and Sadka (1995), and Sinn (2004).
32 The model
There are N ex-ante identical agents.6 At date 1, agent i = 1;2;:::;N
takes an unobservable action bi, which we interpret as reproductive ac-
tivity. At date 2, the number of children born to agent i, denoted by ni,
is revealed to all concerned. Agent i then takes a vector of unobservable
actions, ai = (aij), ij = i1;i2;:::;ini. The vector of outcomes xi = (xij)
becomes known at date 3. At that date, there are no more actions for
i to take. We interpret aij as a broadly-de￿ned educational investment
in child ij, and xij as the child￿ s quality. Agents derive either direct or
indirect utility from their children￿ s quality. The principal derives util-
ity from each agent￿ s utility. We measure aij as the sum of the money
and the money-equivalent of the attention i spends on ij at date 2, and
xij as the present value, at the same date, of ij￿ s future tax payments.
The justi￿cation for measuring quality in this way is that, for any given
income-tax schedule, the tax paid is a monotonic transformation of the
income earned.
The instruments at the principal￿ s disposal are a general income tax,
and two subsidies. The income-tax schedule is assumed given, but the
two subsidy schedules are to be determined, and the choice will a⁄ect the
direction of the redistribution. One of the subsidies is payable at date 2,
when the number of children is known. The other is payable at date 3,
when the children￿ s tax-paying capacities are revealed. In general, the
amount of subsidy to which an agent is entitled at any given date will
depend on all the information available to the principal at that date. As













for the one due at date 3. Agent i chooses bi and ai taking the income-
tax and subsidy schedules as given. The principal chooses the subsidy
schedules taking account of how the N agents will respond to the policy.
Both the principal and the agents apply backward induction. The former
announces s(:) and y (:;:) at date 1.





















6The e⁄ects of di⁄erences in parental ability to make money or raise children are
examined in Balestrino, Cigno and Pettini (2002), and Cigno, Luporini and Pettini
(2004), in an adverse-selection context with deterministic fertility.
4where Ci
t is i￿ s consumption at date t = 1;2;3, and the function Ut (:) is
increasing and strictly concave. The budget constraints facing i are
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at date 2, and
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at date 3, where mt is i￿ s after-tax income at date t, w(aij) the cost of
aij, and c(ni) that part of the cost of raising ni children which does not
depend on ai = (aij).7 The term z(xij) may be interpreted as either the
money-equivalent of the altruistic pleasure that i derives from xij, or the
actual money payment that i will receive from ij at date 3 conditionally
on xij.8 To make sure that i￿ s maximand is concave, we take c(:) and
w(:) to be increasing and strictly convex (increasing marginal costs of
ni and aij), and z (:) to be increasing and strictly concave (diminishing
marginal utility of xij). Assuming that xij is larger than z(xij), there is
a positive ￿scal externality.
Agent i chooses bi and ai taking mt and the subsidy schedules as
given. The principal chooses the subsidy schedules taking account of
how the N agents will respond to them. Both the principal and the
agents apply backward induction. The former announces s(:) and y (:;:)
at date 1.
3 Date-2 decisions
As date 2 is the last decision date, we start by placing ourselves at
that date. The number of children born to agent i, ni, is now given,
and known to everyone concerned. The principal then pays agent i the
subsidy si. Agent i chooses the vector of educational investments ai.
Let X denote the set of possible quality outcomes of each child.
The outcome, xij 2 X, will depend on aij, known only to i, and on a
random shock, ￿
ij, with known density. As the realization of ￿
ij is not
observable by either the principal or the agent, while the realization of
7If aij includes investment of i￿ s time, w(aij) includes an opportunity-cost, and
m2 is then to be interpreted as i￿ s full income at date 2.
8Cigno (1993, 2005) derives conditions under which it is in the interest of non-
altruistic adults to make such payments to their elderly parents.
5xij is observable by both, we follow Mirrlees (1974) in treating xij itself
as a random variable with known density f(xij;aij). Having assumed
that the shocks are identically and independently distributed, the joint





Having interpreted aij as an educational investment, the cumulative
distribution of xij associated with a higher value of aij will ￿rst-order
stochastically dominate the one associated with a lower value of the same




in xij, and that the cumulative distribution of xij is convex in aij. These
are, respectively, the standard Monotone Likelihood Ratio (MLR) and
Convexity of Distribution Function (CDF) conditions which ensure that
i￿ s expected date-2 expected utility is concave in ai, and will allow us
to use the agent￿ s ￿rst-order conditions as incentive-compatibility con-
straints in the principal￿ s optimization.9
3.1 Agents























2 is determined by (3), and Ci
3 by (4). As xi is a vector of
random variables, i will choose the vector of actions ai to maximize (5).



























i = 0; (6)
where the
Q
￿j operator denotes the product of all the i terms other than
ik = ij, for each ij. These conditions tell us that i equates the private
marginal cost of aij, w0(aij)U0
2 (Ci








(3) and (4), we can see that, for si ￿ yij ￿ 0, the private marginal cost
is increasing, and the expected private marginal bene￿t decreasing, in
ni. The chosen value of aij, and the expected value of xij, will then be
decreasing in ni. This is the customary trade-o⁄ between quantity and
quality of children.
9For a demonstration of this proposition in the standard single-agent context, see
Grossman Hart (1983) and Rogerson (1985). For an extension to the multi-agent
case, see Luporini (2006).
63.2 Principal
With n1;n2;:::;nN given, the total value of the subsidies that the gov-
ernment is committed to pay at the present date,
PN
i=1 si, is a given con-
stant. Furthermore, as N is large, and having assumed that the quality
outcomes are i.i.d., the government does not face any uncertainty with re-
































it will receive at the next date. Therefore, the principal￿ s problem is to
choose ai, and a yi for each possible realization of xi,10 i = 1;2;:::;N,



















































where si is now a given constant. There is no need for participation
constraints because the agents must pay their income taxes anyway,
and no agent will refuse a subsidy. It is clear from (8) that the policy
will oblige the current child generation to subsidize the current parent
generation. In its turn, however, the parent generation will have been
required to subsidize the grandparent generation.11

































10Having assumed that the random factors a⁄ecting the quality of each child are
i.i.d., a general result in Holmstr￿m (1982) allows us to assume that the subsidy
optimally accruing to any given agent will depend only on that agent￿ s outcome.
11In a sense, therefore, the government acts as an intergenerational intermediary,
see Cigno (2005).
7where ￿ is the Lagrange-multiplier of the government budget constraint,
measuring the marginal social utility of the expected tax revenue, and ￿ij
the Lagrange-multiplier of the ijth incentive-compatibility constraint,
measuring the marginal social utility of relaxing this constraint. In view

































































































its marginal e⁄ect (negative in second best for i￿ s second-order condition)
on the ijth incentive-compatibility constraint.
3.2.1 First best
Suppose, for a moment, that the principal can observe, hence prescribe,
ai. As the incentive-compatibility constraints is then slack, ￿ij will be










Therefore, the ￿rst-best policy equalizes date-3 consumption across agents.






ij) = K: (15)
12Strictly speaking, what follows is the ￿rst-order condition on aij only in ￿rst
best. In second best, this variable is determined by (6), and the equation which
follows determines ￿ij.
8Therefore, the policy gives i full insurance against the risk of a low Pni
j=1 z(xij) turnout.13 As U0
3 (:) is a decreasing function, it then follows
that the ￿rst-best value of yi is decreasing in each element of xi. As Pni
j=1 z(xij) is increasing in ni, the ￿rst-best yi is decreasing also in ni.








where yFB (:;:) is a decreasing function.14
Is there anything we can say about the prescribed ai? With ￿ij equal
to zero, (10) reduces to
D
ij + ￿E






























































































after substituting from (15), because
P
￿j
z(xik) does not depend on xij.
This tells us that the marginal private cost of aij must be equated to
the expected marginal social bene￿t. In the next section, we will ￿nd
that the ￿rst-best value of U0
2 (Ci
2) is independent of ni. Anticipating
that result, and given (14), we then deduce from (17) that the ￿rst-best
value of aij does not depend on ni. As the agents are di⁄erentiated only
by the number of children, it then follows that all agents will be required
to invest the same amount,
a
ij = aFB; (18)
in each of their children. The quantity-quality trade-o⁄ is gone.
13Full insurance is a common ￿rst-best property. In the standard Principal-Agent
problem, however, it arises from the assumption that the principal is less risk-averse
than the agents. Here, by contrast, the principal is as risk-averse as the agents, and
the property arises from the fact that the principal does not face any risk.
14But keep in mind that this function is not di⁄erentiable with respect to ni,
because the number of children can only take values 0;1;2;:::.
93.2.2 Second best
Let us now go back to the more realistic assumption that aij is not
observable by the principal. As i has no reason to take into account
the e⁄ect of aij on the government budget constraint, we have a moral
hazard problem. The incentive-compatibility constraints (6) will then












we can see that the second-best yi depends on xi. Recalling that, at
this date, the agents are di⁄erentiated by number of children, the date-3













increasing in xij, the second-best value of Ci
3 is clearly increasing in xi:




j=1 z (xij): Recall also that, in ￿rst best, yi is decreasing in xi for
insurance reasons. In second best, however, the policy must give i the
incentive to invest more in each child. For that purpose, yi should then
be increasing in xi. The tension between incentive and insurance con-
siderations makes the second-best e⁄ect of xij on yi
SB ambiguous. Since
z0 (:) is positive and decreasing, insurance is likely to be the predominant
consideration at low realizations of xij, but the incentive consideration
is likely to be paramount at high ones. Therefore, the graph of the
second-best relationship between yi and xij is likely to be U-shaped.






We cannot sign the e⁄ect of ni on ai
SB. An increase in ni will in fact re-





on all the parameters of the model, however, it may raise or lower the
marginal incentive-cost. If the latter rose su¢ ciently fast, the second-
best policy would not get rid of the quantity-quality trade-o⁄.
4 Date-1 decisions
Having seen how the principal, and agent i, will behave a date 2 condi-
tional on ni, we can predict how they will make their choices at date 1.
10The number of children born to i at date 2, ni, depends on an action un-
dertaken by i at date 1, bi, and on a random variable, ￿
i. As we did with
regard to xij, we shall treat ni itself as a random variable, and assume
that the probability of this variable is identically and independently dis-
tributed across agents. In recognition of the fact that ni can only take
values 0;1;2;:::, we write its density in the discrete form p(ni;bi): Hav-
ing interpreted bi as reproductive activity, the cumulative distribution of
ni associated with a higher bi will ￿rst-order stochastically dominate the
one associated with a lower bi. As we did with reference to f(xij;aij),
we assume that p(ni;bi) satis￿es the standard MLR (meaning, in the
present context, that
pbi(ni;bi)
p(ni;bi) is increasing in bi) and CDF conditions.
Among other things, these assumptions ensure that i￿ s expected date-1
utility is concave in bi. We further assume that reproductive activity in
itself bears no cost.
4.1 Agents





























where Ct (ni) denotes the value of Ci
t maximized with respect to ai, for
any given ni. In other words, couples choose their level of reproductive
activity at date 1 knowing that, at date 2, they will optimally choose
how much to invest in any children who might be born as a result.



















] = 0; (21)
tells us that i will raise bi to the point where the expected private mar-
ginal bene￿t equals the current marginal cost. The latter is zero for the
assumption that reproductive activity costs nothing. The cost will come
at date 2, if any children are actually born. The expected value of this
cost is re￿ ected in C2 (:).
4.2 Principal
As N is large, and having assumed that n1;:::;nNi are i.i.d., the govern-
ment does not face uncertainty with regard to either the aggregate value




ni p(ni;bi)si, or the













11The principal will then choose ni, i = 1;2;:::;N, and an si for each pos-




































































and to the incentive-compatibility constraints (21). This problem di⁄ers
from the one solved at date 2 in that ni is still a random variable, and
s(:) is yet to be determined. As at date 2, however, there is no need for
participation constraints, because the income tax is given, and no agent
will turn down the o⁄er of a subsidy.





























pbi = 0; (24)
where ￿i is the Lagrange-multiplier of the incentive-compatibility con-
straint (21), and ￿ the Lagrange-multiplier of the government￿ s date-1
budget constraint (23). As all the agents are now alike,
￿
i = ￿:









If bi were observable, the incentive-compatibility constraint (21) would
not be binding, and the solution would then give us the ￿rst-best policy.
As ￿ would then be zero, (25) would reduce to
U
0
2 (C2(n)) = ￿:
Therefore, the ￿rst-best policy equalizes date-2 consumption across agents
and states of nature. In view of (3), and given that U0
2 (:) is decreasing,
and c(:) increasing, if si were non-increasing in ni, Ci
2 would be decreas-







12where sFB (:) is an increasing function.15
Since reproductive behaviour is not observable, however, and given
that i has no reason to take into account the e⁄ect of bi on the princi-
pal￿ s budget constraint, there is another a moral hazard problem. The
incentive-compatibility constraint (23) will then be binding, and the
principal￿ s optimization will yield a second-best policy. Having assumed
that
pb(ni;bi)








where sSB (:) is an increasing function like sFB (:). In ￿rst best, however,
the only reason for promising higher subsidies to the agents will have
more children is to compensate them for the additional cost they have
to bear at date 2 . In second best, by contrast, there is also an incentive
reason. Therefore, an extra birth will raise the date-2 subsidy more in
second than in ￿rst best.
5 Discussion
We have examined a situation where the quantity (number) of children
born to a couple, and the qualities (lifetime earning and thus, for any
given income-tax schedule, tax-paying capacities) of these children, are
random variables with known density conditional on actions undertaken
by the couple. The action which conditions the probability distribution
of the quantity of children is interpreted as reproductive activity, the one
which conditions the probability distribution of a child￿ s quality as ed-
ucational investment in the broadest sense (money and attention spent
on the child). A couple, therefore, can e⁄ectively choose the probability
distribution of the quantity of children by choosing its level of repro-
ductive activity, and the probability distribution of a child￿ s quality by
choosing how much to invest in the child. The realized quantity and
qualities of each couple￿ s children are observable by everyone concerned,
but the couple￿ s level of reproductive activity, and the amounts it in-
vested in these children are private information. Couples derive either
direct or indirect utility from their children￿ s quality. The government
derives utility from that of each couple.
We have identi￿ed two justi￿cations for government intervention.
The ￿rst one arises from the fact that a couple￿ s behaviour has an e⁄ect
on the government￿ s future tax revenue, but the couple has no reason
to take this e⁄ect into account in choosing how to behave. Having as-
sumed that this behaviour is not observable by the government, there is
then a moral hazard problem. The second justi￿cation follows from the
15As the number of children is a discrete variable, this function is not di⁄erentiable.
13assumption that quantity and quality are identically and independently
distributed. While couple face risks in respect of both these variables,
therefore, the government does not face any risk with regard to its fu-
ture tax revenue. Partly as a consequence of this asymmetry, we have
assumed that the former are not allowed to borrow against their chil-
dren￿ s expected earnings, while the latter is free to borrow against its
future tax revenue. In addition to a general income tax, assumed given,
the optimal policy uses two subsidies, one payable when the quantity
of children is known, the other when their qualities of these children
are revealed. Quality may vary across children even if they received the
same treatment from their parents, because each is the result of an inde-
pendent draw. The subsidy payable when the children are born may be
interpreted as a family allowance. The one payable when the children￿ s
qualities are revealed lends itself to two possible interpretations. As a
person￿ s earning capacity can be reliably assessed only when this per-
son is in middle life, and his or her parents on the point of retirement,
it seems natural to interpret this second subsidy as a pension entitle-
ment.16 Alternatively, and to the extent that scholastic performance is
a predictor of a student￿ s future earning capacity, the subsidy can be in-
terpreted as the sum of the scholarships payable to a couple￿ s school-age
children,17 Each of these scholarships will depend not only on the child￿ s
own scholastic performance, but also on the performance of each of the
child￿ s siblings.
The policy optimization has a Principal-Agent format, with the gov-
ernment in the role of principal, and couples in that of agents. In ￿rst
best, private behaviour is observable. The government can then order
each couple to undertake the ￿rst-best level of reproductive activity,
which turns out to be the same for all couples, and to invest the ￿rst-
best quantity of money and own time, the same for all children and all
couples, in each child who happens to be born. The ￿rst-best subsidy
payable as soon as the children are born is increasing in the quantity of
children. The one payable when the qualities of these children become
known is decreasing in these qualities. This policy redistributes in favour
of couples with more children, and with less able children, and provides
all couples with full insurance. In second best, private behaviour is not
observable. As the government can neither tell couples what to do in
16For a pension reform proposal based on the principle that a working-age person
should have an incentive to produce future contributive capacity, see Cigno (2009).
17Interpreting it a sum of university scholarships is less appropriate, because par-
ents do not have the same degree of control over their university-age children as
over their school-age ones. For an analysis of university scholarships, see Cigno and
Luporini (2009).
14the bedroom, nor order parents to invest in any child at any speci￿ed
level, it must then give them the incentive to do so. The second-best
subsidy payable when the children are born is still increasing in the num-
ber of children, but rises faster than in ￿rst best because incentive and
redistribution considerations pull in the same direction. By contrast,
the subsidy payable when the qualities of these children are revealed
is the result of a compromise between insurance or redistributive con-
siderations on the one hand, and incentive considerations on the other.
This subsidy is then likely to be decreasing in the quality of each of the
couple￿ s children at low realizations of this variable, increasing at high
ones.
How does the second-best policy applicable to the case examined here
di⁄er from the one applicable in the one where a couple can determin-
istically choose how many children to have? The latter is examined in
Cigno, Luporini and Pettini (2003). There, a couple can be ordered to
(threatened with a severe penalty if it does not) procure the second-best
number of children. As there is then no need for the government to o⁄er
couples costly fertility incentives as in the present case, the policy uses
only one instrument, a child-speci￿c subsidy dependent on the child￿ s
own quality.18
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